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Abstract 
This paper shows the effect of school staff autonomy on educational performance. The distinctive feature with 
existing literature is that we employ variation in autonomy within the same country and within the same school 
type to reduce the omitted variables problems. To fully capture the informational advantage of local actors, we 
define autonomy as the operational empowerment of the school’s direction and teachers. The Flemish secondary 
school system in Belgium is analyzed as it displays unique within school type variation in school staff autonomy. 
This variation originates from autonomously operating school governing bodies that can group multiple schools 
and are free to delegate responsibilities to the school staff. Combining detailed school level and pupil level data 
from the PISA 2006 study with a semiparametric hierarchical model, we find strong positive effect of school staff 
autonomy on educational performance. The result is shown to be robust to problems of reverse causality and 
simultaneity. Quantile regression shows that both low and high-performers benefit from school staff autonomy. 
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1 Introduction and related literature
A remarkable stylized fact of educational economics is that higher school resources do not
necessarily yield higher pupil performance. Evidence for an overall large effect of school re-
source policies on pupil performance is largely missing (Hanushek, 2003; Wo¨ßmann, 2003).
It cannot be excluded however that the effect of input-based policies on pupil performance
is moderated by the incentive structure of school actors (Hanushek, 2003). Since the in-
centive structure of school actors is embedded in school institutions, insight in the latter
may be crucial to understand the relation between school resources and pupil performance.
There is accumulating cross-country evidence that getting incentives right by a combina-
tion of monitoring and autonomy is beneficial for educational efficiency (Wo¨ßmann, 2008).
Since these studies compare institutions across countries the results may be biased because
of an obvious omitted variable problem. Any other source of cross-country variation, like
legal or cultural differences, may indeed bias the results. To identify the effect of school
autonomy from within-country changes, Hanushek et al. (2011) use a panel estimation
with country fixed effects on student level data from 42 countries from the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA) 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009 dataset. As school
autonomy is considered as a country level average, within-country selection does not affect
their estimates. Moreover, the use of country fixed effect estimation ensures that estimates
are not affected by time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity. The authors find that the
effect of school autonomy depends on the level of economic and educational development.
In other words, in strong (weak) institutions, considerable academic gains (losses) are found
from decentralized decision-making. In addition, the authors find larger gains from school
autonomy if an adequate accountability system is in place such as central examination.
However, as secondary education is decentralized to the regional level in several countries
(e.g. Belgium, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom), there is still regional level institutional
variation that can affect the results from country fixed effects estimations.
Moreover, the assumption that institutional features such as the awareness of the impor-
tance of education and academic culture are time-invariant is hard in the specific setting.
One example of time-varying institutional features is the change in institutional settings
at country-level after the publication of dramatic scores for some countries in the first
round of PISA (i.e., PISA 2000). This publication was the start of an “an intense political
debate that spread over almost all areas of the political and economic life, as the human
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capital acquired in a nation’s schooling system is generally regarded as the most valuable
resource of society”(Ammermu¨ller, 2004). Not without reason, the PISA 2000 publication
was called the ‘PISA shock ’ in Germany.
In studies that use within-country variation of monitoring and autonomy, the problem of
adequately controlling for (time-varying) institutional variation at country level is of course
avoided. However, almost all student level within-country evidence of positive effects of
school autonomy comes from studies comparing different types of schools (see e.g. the
charter school literature, referenced in e.g. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011)). As noted by
Hanushek et al. (2011), it is difficult to extract school autonomy effects from school type
effects such as parental choice, quality of information or constraints on school location.
Clark (2009) uses a different kind of variation, namely the variation in autonomy by the
formation of a new type of public school with more autonomy (i.e., the ‘Grant Maintained ’
schools) in the UK between 1988 and 1997. The authors use a regression discontinuity
design to compare public schools in which the vote to become a more autonomous ‘grant
maintained ’ public school barely won with those in which the vote barely lost. Significant
and persistent achievement gains are found for schools that opted to become ‘grant main-
tained ’ schools. Still, also in this study, school autonomy effects are not fully separated
from other school type specific effects as variation in school autonomy is between school
type.
The first contribution of this paper is that we employ within-country, within school type
variation of autonomy on a dataset of pupil level performance, which gives us the degrees
of freedom needed for statistical inference, and allows us to better isolate the school au-
tonomy effects from school-type and country-specific effects.
This within school type variation comes from the particular structure of secondary educa-
tion in Flanders, one of the three regions to which education is decentralized in Belgium.
The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of education is the cornerstone of the Flemish
educational landscape, illustrated in Figure 1 in Appendix.1 Freedom of education implies
free school choice and freedom to start a school and autonomously organize education for
1See Devos and Tuytens (2006), OECD (2008a) and OECD (2011) for a complete overview of the
Flemish education system.
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any natural or legal person. Since the School Pact (May 25th, 1959)2, freedom of education
implies in addition that education should be costless. The autonomously operating school
governing bodies receive government funding if they meet minimal requirements, in partic-
ular, reaching the legally imposed final standards.3 In practice, freedom of education has
resulted in large autonomy for non-profit school governing bodies that can group multiple
schools. The school governing bodies are clustered in three main eduction networks: 1)
the Flemish community education network (GO!), 2) the publicly funded, publicly man-
aged education network (OGO) and 3) the publicly funded, privately managed education
network (VGO).
The publicly funded, privately managed education network (VGO) groups umbrella orga-
nizations of catholic schools (VKO) and Small Education providers (OKO; e.g. Steiner
schools, protestant schools) and school governing bodies with no umbrella organization.
About 75.1 percent of pupils in ordinary secondary education are in privately managed
schools, with only a very small proportion in non-catholic schools.4
The publicly funded, publicly managed education network (OGO) groups schools of Flem-
ish cities and municipalities and provincial schools. In the first, the local authority is the
governing body of the school, whereas in the latter the provincial authority is the governing
body of education. This network represents about 7.6 percent of pupils in comprehensive
secondary education.
The Flemish Community Education Network (GO!) groups 17.3 percent of ordinary sec-
ondary education pupils. It has as meso-level school groups that are together with the
education network the governing body of multiple schools.
All three educational networks have entrusted considerable school policy autonomy to
school governing boards. The non-profit governing boards can either determine school
policy themselves or delegate operational autonomy to the school principals and teachers.
Between school type variation (with main school types: community schools, city schools,
provincial schools, and subsidized private schools) exists because the number of schools
per governing board can differ between school types. Table 1 illustrates that community
school governing boards group on average 8.50 schools, while this is only 2.66 in subsidized
2The School Pact ended the so called ‘school wars’ between catholics and liberals.
3Additionally, the School Pact poses that each pupil should be able to follow neutral education if
wanted, with as necessary condition a geographically disperse network of public schools.
4Data from 2011-2012 (Department of Education & Training, 2012).
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private education. In all school types, there is large variation in the number of schools
per school governing board. Further, there is considerable between school type variation
in the composition of school boards. For example, while in public education school board
members often have a political background or connection, in subsidized education many
school board members have a connection with the Catholic Church.
<Table 1 about here >
Panel discussions between school principals (Van Petegem et al., 2009), case studies of
schools (among others Caenepeel (1988), Devos et al. (1989) and Devos et al. (1999) and
Van Petegem et al. (2009)) and an OECD review team (Day et al., 2008) document extreme
differences in the responsibility structure within school governing bodies. In some school
governing bodies, the school direction is delegated full operational responsibility over its
own school and the school governing body only intervenes when large problems occur.
In other governing bodies, the school principal is considered as a mere employee of the
school governing body, with virtually no autonomy. Therefore, in Flemish Belgium, there
is unique within school type variation in school autonomy. We use variation in the amount
of autonomy that trickles down to the lowest level, the school’s direction and teachers as
a strategy to identify the effect of school actor incentives on the relation between school
resources and output.
This variation originates in subsidized education from the fact that there are no rules that
exhaustively define the role of school principals. For the Flemish Community Education
Network (GO!), the Special Decree of 14 July 1998 stipulates which responsibilities should
be delegated to the school direction.5 However, there is large variation in the interpretation
of the law and the actual autonomy that is delegated to the school principals. Some
governing boards take all financial decisions, while others stand aloof (Van Petegem et al.,
2009, p. 20-22).6 OECD (2008b) concludes that “Even in countries that do have legislative
5Examples of school direction responsibilities are the general and pedagogic organization of the school,
the organization of extramural activities and the allocation of the by the school group formulated school
budget. Besides these by law delegated responsibilities, the school principal can be delegated extra re-
sponsibilities by the school group.
6In particular, Devos et al. (1999) and year reports of schools in GO! education show that in some
school groups, each school is free to formulate and allocate the full budget for its own school and the role
of the school board is only to ratify the budgets if there are no large problems. In other schools, financial
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frameworks to define the responsibilities of school principals, there are concerns about the
relevance and clarity of the legislation...in Flemish Belgium there is no comprehensive
statutory description of the post of the school leader.”
However, selection issues and simultaneity problems can bias results from this kind of stu-
dent level cross-sectional study. Therefore, we discuss the issues thoroughly and argue why
our results are not driven by self-selection of students, reverse causality and the problem
that more dynamic school teachers and principals will simultaneously boost educational
performance and increase their operational autonomy, without there needs to be a direct
effect of school autonomy on outcomes. In line with qualitative research, we argue that
approximately random variation in characteristics and composition of the school boards is
the main source of the variation in responsibility structures within school governing bodies.
The second contribution of this paper is that we restrict ourselves to a narrow definition of
autonomy. We only look into the effects of autonomy of principals and teachers, the local
agents that, through their local informational advantage, are supposed to boost educational
outcomes. This identification strategy brings our work closer to a clean test of the supposed
effects of autonomy in a principal-agent framework (see below), where the government is
the principal and the local school actors (school’s direction and teachers) are the agents.7
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In a second section, we discuss the
theoretical background for the expected effect of school autonomy on educational perfor-
mance. In section 3 and 4, we present the PISA data and the semiparametric multi-level
analysis. In section 5, we discuss the results on the effect of school staff autonomy on
educational achievement. Section 6 concludes.
cells of the governing board formulate the school budgets and leave little room for budget allocation by
the school principals (e.g. only small purchases of educational material).
7Hallinger et al. (1996) were the first to measure principals’ activities in key dimensions of a school’s
instructional program and to relate these to student outcomes such as reading achievement. Wo¨ßmann
(2003) is one of the first to look into the effect of individual teacher influence over teaching on student
performance.
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2 Theoretical background
The impact of school autonomy is linked to several strands of the literature. The decen-
tralization of education may boost efficiency and productivity by eliminating unnecessary
bureaucratic burdens (see Niskanen (1971) and Niskanen (1991), for seminal work on bud-
get maximizing bureaucrats). School autonomy may help schools to overcome bureaucratic
rigidity and in this way impact student performance positively (Bottani and Favre, 2001;
Chubb and Moe, 1990).
Entrusting the provision of education to local agents may also lead to more efficient pro-
vision because local agents will be closer and more responsive to student needs and pref-
erences since students can ‘vote with their feet’ by changing school or even community.
Tiebout (1956) shows that decentralized public good provision may, under certain condi-
tions, yield the efficient provision of public goods like education. Hoxby (1999) confirms
this Tiebout hypothesis for local school productivity under much less restrictive conditions.
This suggests that the combination of decentralization and free school choice may indeed
provide greater opportunities for local citizens and students to monitor and discipline the
local agents that are responsible for educational policy, thereby creating greater efficiency
and productivity.
If the decentralization of education is accompanied by public information on school perfor-
mance, it may also be conducive to yardstick competition (see Shleifer (1985), and Besley
and Case (1995)) among schools, in this way encouraging the adoption of more effective
teaching methods and more efficient operational procedures. Card et al. (2010) for example
recently find significant effects of enhanced competition on the test score gains of students
in Canada in all studied school systems. They however also point at a possible negative
effect of this yardstick competition. It cannot be excluded that “in more competitive mar-
kets teachers and principals spend more time and effort preparing for standardized tests,
and less on other aspects of learning. If “test skills” have limited intellectual value, the
effort devoted to competing over test outcomes is socially wasteful, and the higher test
score gains observed in more competitive markets may be counter-productive” (Card et al.
(2010), p. 29-30).
In weak institutional environments, decentralization may have some additional negative im-
plications, like increased levels of uncoordinated rent-seeking and corruption as government
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structures become more complex and devoluted (Fan et al., 2009), increased coordination
costs and slower institutional reform.
The most important negative consequence of increased autonomy may lie in a potential
principal-agent problem (see Wo¨ßmann et al. (2007)). The government (principal) tries to
improve cognitive skill creation by delegating responsibilities to schools (agents) that are
assumed to have a local information advantage over the principal. A principal-agent prob-
lem appears when the interests of the government and the school diverge and information
is asymmetric. Interests typically diverge for decisions that influence the financial position
of the school or the workload for school actors. Budget formation and curriculum content
are therefore policy areas with a high probability of divergence between the interests of the
government and the school. In process and personnel decisions on the other hand, little
divergence of interest is expected. This principal-agent problem requires to put in place
appropriate accounting systems. With effective accountability, autonomy is expected to
enhance educational performance. Central examinations are a widely used accountabil-
ity mechanism to align incentives between schools and the government (Wo¨ßmann et al.,
2007), but other mechanisms can be used to attain this goal.
In Flanders, instead of central examinations, inspection teams investigate on a regular
basis whether the curriculum and teaching process are aimed at reaching the centrally
imposed final standards and whether budget formation is in accordance with the posed
requirements. Benchmarking by parents is possible as the inspection reports are publicly
available. In addition, freedom in budget formation is limited to additional funding, above
the centrally imposed funding system. The size of these additional budgets is very small in
comparison to the school budget. It mainly consists of revenues from student enterprises
(such as a bakery in a bakery school) and donations by parents to finance e.g. school trips
or school material (Poesen-Vandeputte and Bollens, 2008). Consequently, discretionary
power of schools are limited on divisive issues like budget formation and curriculum de-
velopment. We therefore expect that the principal-agent problem will be limited in our
case, and that the institution of school autonomy, through improved incentives for schools
and teachers, will affect resource-allocation decisions and ultimately the educational per-
formance of students positively.
It is worth noting that the positive effect of autonomy can also be supported by Oates’
efficiency theorem (see e.g. Hindriks and Myles (2006, chapter 17) for an overview). Indeed
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under Oates’ approach, autonomy is beneficial to better match local preferences and needs
(the preference matching benefit) but could be detrimental in terms of lack of coordination
and spillovers (the spillover costs). To determine if autonomy is beneficial it is necessary to
compare the magnitude of the costs and benefits. It is easily seen that most items in school
policy (such as budget formation, course content, teacher selection, disciplinary policies,
student admission,etc.) display both preferences matching benefits and spillover costs.
However the relative magnitude of these cost-benefits vary from one item to the other.
Student and teacher selection is probably the one with highest spillover costs and the lowest
preference matching benefit. It is therefore natural that we observe little school autonomy
on such issues. On the other hand, the budget allocation presents low spillover costs and
high preference matching benefits so autonomy is expected to produce better outcome
than centralized decision making with uniform policy choice. In fact without spillover,
decentralization is always superior. With spillover, decentralization can still dominate if
there is sufficient difference across school in terms of needs and preferences. This argument
relies heavily on the assumption that autonomy leads to better differentiation in educational
policy to match local needs, and that the spillover effects are limited.
Last but certainly not least, autonomy is linked with intrinsic motivation. Human be-
haviour is driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Both economic and psycho-
logical literature (i.e., Frey (1993), Frey (1994), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and Deci
and Ryan (1985)) pinpoint the so called “hidden cost of reward”, and cost of control by
destroying the “psychological contract”. Frey (1993) shows in a principal-agent framework
that monitoring by the principal can be perceived by the agents as an indication of distrust,
with lower work effort by the agents as result. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) shows that
extrinsic motivation (such as price incentives) has a crowding-out effect on intrinsic mo-
tivation. Differently put, price incentives or external intervention that is perceived to be
controlling can reduce the feeling of living up to the civic duty and diminish altruistic be-
haviour. This implies that the intrinsic motivation of the school staff and education quality
is expected to be higher in schools where the school staff perceives to have considerable
responsibilities.
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3 Data
We hypothesize that a combination of school staff empowerment in budgeting and effec-
tive accountability will, after controlling for socio-economic and school-level institutional
variation, have a positive effect on educational performance. We discuss in this section the
used data, the dependent variable, the unique within school type variation in budgeting
autonomy and the controls.
3.1 PISA 2006
We focus on the educational setting in Flanders, as its specific characteristics of education
allow for a within school type analysis of school autonomy as we show below.8 We use
the PISA 2006 dataset. This because only for the sampled schools in 2006, we were able
to group the schools in the four main school types in Flanders (as discussed, education
organized by cities, provinces, the Flemish Community and publicly funded, privately
operating entities (mainly catholic education)), whereas PISA only groups the schools in
‘public’ and ‘publicly funded, privately operating schools’.
In 2006, the PISA survey was implemented in 57 countries. The main focus of PISA 2006 is
on science, however all pupils are also requested to complete a standardized test on math,
science and reading and fill out a survey with questions related to their family background,
views on issues related to science, the environment, careers, learning time and teaching
and learning approaches of science.
Tests are typically constructed to assess between 4,500 and 10,000 students of age 15 in
each country. To sample the target population of 15-year old pupils that are at least
in grade 7, PISA 2006 has implemented a two-stage stratified sample design. In stage
1, for each stratum9, schools are sampled proportionally to size from a list of schools in
the region (PPS sampling). The target was 150 schools in each region. In stage 2, 35
pupils are randomly drawn from a list of 15-year old pupils in the school.10 Final student
8Since 1989, Belgian education is organized by the Flemish community, the French-speaking community
and the German-speaking community. Hirtt (2007) argues that Flanders has the most effective account-
ability system of the three communities.
9A group of schools, formed to improve the precision of sample based estimates.
10If the school has less than 35 pupils, all pupils are included in the sample.
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weights are constructed to correct for varying selection probabilities of the students.11
In PISA 2006 the plausible value approach is used to estimate the pupil performance in
respectively mathematics, science and reading literacy. These plausible values are random
values from the posterior distribution and cannot be aggregated at pupil level (OECD,
2005). Therefore, in what follows, we use the first plausible value component to estimate
educational outcomes in math, science and reading at pupil level.12 In Appendix, we
discuss the interpretation of plausible values. A Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR)
procedure with 80 replication estimates - described in OECD (2005)- is used to construct
standard errors and to account for sampling variation (OECD, 2009).
Pupils in special education or part-time education are dropped from the sample. Pupils in
private-funded schools or with missing values for some variables are also dropped from the
sample. In addition, we do not take pupils in schools with less than 4 pupils per teacher
into account as we expect that these schools have among others a different educational
approach.13 By this, the sample is reduced to 3603 observations. Sub-schools are defined to
control for ability tracking in general, technical-arts and vocational education. A sub-school
is defined as a unit that provides either general, technical-arts, or vocational education.
When a school provides both general and technical or arts education, then the school is
treated as two separate (sub-)schools. The sample consists of 126 schools and 245 sub-
schools.
3.2 Student performance
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the educational achievement of pupils in Flanders.
Standardized test scores for math, science and reading are high in Flanders (PISA average is
500). But the high standard deviation of educational outcomes indicates that the inequality
in individual test scores is also high.
11This occurs because certain subgroups that are over- or under-sampled, the information of school
size at the time is not completely correct, school non-response, student non-response and the inclusion of
trimming weights to ensure stable estimates.(OECD, 2009)
12As plausible values are random draws, the choice to take the first plausible value is arbitrary. Other
plausible values could be taken as well.
13However, sensitivity tests available on request show that our results still hold when we do consider
these schools with very few pupils per teacher as comparable and take them into the analysis.
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<Table 2 about here >
3.3 School staff autonomy
School autonomy is a rather vague concept. In our study we will explicitly focus on auton-
omy of principals and teachers, using the data made available by PISA (2006). The PISA
dataset among other things looks specifically into the roles that principals and teachers
might play in educational decision-making and contains measures of centralization and
decentralization for these different functions.
Table 3 illustrates how the level of school autonomy varies item-by-item in Flanders. In
particular, the principal is asked who has the main responsibility for any specific item. The
principal can tick multiple levels if there is joint decision making on a particular item. In
line with Eurydice (2007) and Eurydice (2008), the PISA 2006 data show that Flanders is
characterized by considerable school (group) autonomy in staffing, budget allocation and
formation, assessment and discipline of pupils and textbook choice. Neither schools, nor
intermediate government institutions have the autonomy to set the salaries of teaching and
non-teaching staff. Although selection of students by schools is restricted to avoid exclu-
sion of minority groups, the school’s direction remains largely in charge of approving the
admission of pupils to the school. There is noteworthy variation in school staff autonomy
for the items on firing teachers, budget allocation, budget formation, course content and
courses offered.
We only consider in our analysis the variation in budget formation and allocation. It is
for these items that the school governing bodies have not equally decentralized decision
making to the school staff. Since the autonomy in budget formation is rather limited
(as it needs to be in line with the centrally imposed funding system), our main focus is
on budget allocation. We defined school autonomy in budget allocation (formation) as a
binary indicator, equal to one if the school principal ticks that he/she or the teachers have a
considerable responsibility in the task of budget allocation (formation), zero otherwise. The
reviewed theoretical studies do not pinpoint perverse effects of joint-decision making, i.e.
when the school governing board and the school principal have considerable responsibility.
12
Therefore, we did not focus on a strict definition of school autonomy that excludes joint-
decision making. Table 4 shows that over 80 percent of the sampled schools in both public
and private education have considerable autonomy on budget allocation. Less than 40
percent of the sampled schools do not share this responsibility with higher levels. However,
as shown further, all results hold when we alter the definition of school autonomy.
We did not focus on autonomy in curricular content and courses offered as we expect inter-
pretation issues for these items. As discussed in the Introduction, the Flemish government
sets the final standards, but schools have considerable autonomy in how to reach the final
standards. In practice, this amounts to a centrally imposed programme of basic courses,
and considerable autonomy in the curricular content of optional subjects. As the final stan-
dards are detailed and well defined (see Hirtt (2007)), the principals can either interpret
they have considerable autonomy (in reaching the posed final standards) or little autonomy
(as there is little room to teach other things than the centrally imposed programme). As
a result, we note that principals tick both themselves and/or the educational authorities
as decision makers in course content and courses offered.
In addition, we did not include autonomy in firing teachers into the analysis as we don’t
believe school actors can actually make use of the large authority to fire teachers, as regu-
lations strongly limit the possibility to fire a teacher, unless a serious fault is established.
<Table 3 about here >
<Table 4 about here >
3.4 Control variables
Student characteristics We control for student-level heterogeneity by including family
background, gender, education track, grade retention and the weekly followed lessons of
the test subject in our model (see Table 5 and 6). To relate variation in outcomes to family
background, we consider 2 socio-economic variables: socio-economic status and migration
status. Family socio-economic status is estimated by PISA 2006 as a composite index of
the Economic and Socio-Cultural Status (ESCS) of a pupil, derived from (1) the highest
occupational status of each student’s parents, (2) their highest educational level, and (3) a
summary measure of household possessions. For the sampled students of all participating
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OECD countries, the mean is 0 and standard deviation is 1. The ESCS score shows sub-
stantial variation across pupils in Flanders.
For migration status, three proxies are used. First-generation immigrants and second-
generation immigrants are respectively defined as pupils that are not born in Belgium and
pupils that are born in Belgium, but are children of immigrants. Pupils that are first- or
second-generation immigrant and do not speak an official Belgian language at home are
grouped in a third variable. The proportion of non-native pupils is around 5 percent. 2
percent of the pupils in the sample do not speak an official Belgian language at home.
Pupils are tracked in the first year of secondary education in either general, technical-arts
or vocational education based on academic records. In our filtered sample, 50 percent of
pupils are in general education (high track), 33 percent are in technical-arts education
(middle track) and 17 percent in vocational education (low track). If a pupil has not
reached the basic skills determined by the posed final standards in a school year, grade
repetition and re-orientation to lower tracks are used. In our sample, 21 percent of pupils
are lagging behind.
School characteristics To control for school-level heterogeneity, we include controls for
variation in educational resources, teacher shortage, class and school size, school type, so-
cial segregation, selectivity by schools and urbanization (see Table 5 and 6).
1. Educational resources. Schools receive funding and ‘teaching hours’ according to
the number of pupils. Schools with more disadvantaged pupils receive additional
resources (’GOK policy’). On average, schools have a modest lack of educational
resources (e.g. instructional material, labs) (the average is above the PISA 2006
average of 0).
2. Teacher shortage. In line with Rivkin et al. (2005) and Kane et al. (2006), prelimi-
nary analysis showed that the relation between formal teacher quality and educational
performance is not significant. As almost all teachers in Flanders are certified, we
dropped this variable. In contrast, shortage in educational personnel can have se-
vere negative effects on the true teacher quality and teaching process in a school.
Therefore, a negative sign is expected. For math and science, there is a systematic
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shortage in teachers.14 Therefore, we focus on shortage of adequate teaching staff in
areas other than math, science and reading.
3. Class and school size. The effect of school and class size on performance is difficult
to disentangle from the selection effect (i.e. parents choose better schools that are
consequently of larger size). Therefore, we use school size and student-teacher ratio
to control for heterogeneity in class and school size.
4. School type. We control for the 4 main school types in Flanders: Flemish commu-
nity schools, city schools, provincial schools and subsidized private-operating schools.
As discussed, private-granted schools are only a negligible proportion of the school
population.
5. Social segregation. When schools organize different tracks, each school track is con-
sidered as a distinct sub-school. There is considerable variation in sub-school average
ESCS, indicating social segregation between (sub-)schools. A quarter of the students
are in sub-schools with an average ESCS below or equal to the OECD student av-
erage of 0, while the most elite sub-school groups students with an ESCS which is
on average 64 percent higher than the OECD student standard deviation. As shown
in Hindriks et al. (2010), there is less social segregation between school types than
between school tracks.
6. Selectivity by schools. Selection by schools is officially not allowed within a track.
However, Table 5 indicates selection on academic record or recommendation is fre-
quently used.
7. Urbanization. Table 5 shows that 60 percent of the sampled pupils receive education
in a town with 15,000 up to 100,000 inhabitants.
Variables related to school competition could be included. In Hanushek and Luque (2003),
a significant positive effect is found of competition of private schools. Hoxby (2000) finds
that Tiebout choice leads to better school performance in the US.15 However, as we did
not find any effect of a proxy for the number of competing schools in preliminary analysis,
we dropped this variable to reduce the number of missing values.
14In preliminary analysis, we did not find effects of shortages in math, science or language teachers.
15In Hoxby (2003), an overview of the economics of school choice can be found.
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Overall, we try to obtain insight into the relation between school autonomy -adequately
measured - and educational performance, while controlling substantively for heterogeneity
in student composition and institutional settings between schools. To further control for
heterogeneity, we allow for non-linearities by the use of a flexible semiparametric econo-
metric methodology.
<Table 5 about here >
<Table 6 about here >
4 Methodology
Educational settings are complex and heterogeneous. First, the largest part of the empiri-
cal data have a multilevel structure (pupils are nested within classes, classes within schools,
schools within regions and school types, etc.). It is necessary to include this highly multi-
level data structure into the empirical analysis to obtain unbiased estimates (Raudenbush
and Bryk, 2002). This can be done by the use of a so called ‘hierarchical’ or ‘mixed’ model.
This implies that the intercept - and in some models also the slopes - is allowed to ran-
domly vary between groups. To estimate the effects of school-level institutional factors and
family background on student achievement, a multilevel regression analysis is carried out
where covariates are distributed at two levels: the students and schools. In an educational
setting, unobserved school effects are expected from school-level disparities in e.g. the
unobserved academic culture of school staff. As students are clustered in different schools,
the assumption of independent noise is violated. It is thus necessary to include random
school effects into the empirical analysis to obtain unbiased estimates. However, to include
random effects, we need to make the assumption that the unobserved school effects are not
correlated with the included school-level variables.16
Second, as result of the complex, heterogeneous nature of the data structure, imposing
parametric assumptions on the relationship between educational inputs and output can
lead to biased estimates if there is misspecification. As it is unclear how all variables affect
educational performance, it is advisable to use a more flexible approach. Nonlinearities can
16We confirm in estimates available upon request that all models hold when we exclude the random
school effects from the respective models.
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be addressed in different ways. First, polynomial expansions can be considered. This would
be easy to implement, but the risk of introducing multicollinearity is very high. Second,
nonparametric approaches can be considered. Fully non-parametric approaches do not
impose parametric assumptions on the functional form, but imply the so called ‘curse of
dimensionality’ - that is that including a large amount of regressors dramatically slows down
convergence speed - and involves practical difficulties to include random effects. To avoid
the ‘curse of dimensionality’, we use a semiparametric additive mixed model approach.
We define pupil test scores of pupil i (with i = 1, . . . , n) in school j (with j = 1, . . . ,m) as
a function of socio-economic, institutional predictors and unobserved determinants such as
innate ability and random noise at the pupil level ￿i,j. To allow for hierarchically clustered
noise, we define θj as the random effect of school j. The semiparametric varying-intercept
model is defined as:
PISA test scorei,j =β0 + β1School staff autonomyj
+
p=k￿
p=2
βpStudent characteristicp,i,j
+
q=k+l￿
q=k+1
βqSchool characteristicq,j
+ s1(ESCSi,j) + s2(Sub-school ESCSi,j)
+ s3(School educational resourcesj)
+ s4(Student-teacher ratioj) + s5(School sizej)
+ θj + ￿i,j, (1)
where βf , with f = 1, . . . , k+ l are the fixed parameters of the categorical variables related
to school staff autonomy, student characteristics and school characteristics and sg, with
g = 1, . . . , 5 are the smooth functions for the 5 additive continuous variables.17
Semiparametric regressions can be estimated by the use of kernel weights or by using
piecewise polynomial functions - splines. Each approach has its own merits and drawbacks
in a particular setting. We opt for a spline based approach as it is less cumbersome to use
17Multivariate smooths can also be introduced, but are not used in this analysis as multivariate tensor
products of B-splines (see further) imply a dramatic loss of degrees of freedom.
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with large datasets and allows the inclusion of random effects. In particular, to smooth
the continuous variables, we opt for the penalized splines (P-splines) approach of Eilers
and Marx (1996), discussed in detail in Appendix.
The interest is not in the control variables per se. Therefore, if we find a non-linear
effect of a smoothed variable, we only include information on the direction of influence.
If the semiparametric model pinpoints towards a linear relationship between educational
performance and a specific continuous variable, we drop the smooth term and include the
variable parametrically.
5 Empirical results
Table 7 shows six different models in which we measure the effect of autonomy of the
school’s staff in budget allocation on its educational performance in math. The focus is
on math as Flanders is in this subject persistently ranked as a top performer (see e.g.
De Meyer and Warlop (2010)). In addition, many teaching hours are devoted to this
subject (see Table 5).
In a first model (i.e., Math I, first column of Table 7), we only control for student-level
heterogeneity, school type and urbanization. Model Math I explains 55 percent of the
variation of educational performance between pupils. We find an effect of migration status
over and above the effect of the socio-economic status of pupils. The effect is amplified if
the non-native pupil does not speak a Belgian language at home. We also find significant
effects of school type and educational tracks. However, due to strong self-selection of pupils
in school types and educational tracks, based on unobserved variables, a value-added ap-
proach is needed to obtain more reliable evidence on this matter. As expected, the control
variables for grade repetition and teacher shortage are significant.
Closer to our purpose, we find a clear positive effect of the autonomy in budget allocation
on educational performance. Math performance is 13 points higher in schools with consid-
erable autonomy in budgeting. As in all the following models, we do not find significant
interaction between the effect of autonomy in budgeting and respectively school type or
the average social position of pupils in a sub-school.
If we control additionally for school-level heterogeneity - by including teacher shortage,
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selectivity of the school, sub-school average ESCS, school educational resources, student-
teacher ratio and school size- the relation of interest is still significantly positive, but is
estimated to be only 6.73 points. In line with Hindriks et al. (2010), we don’t find an effect
of the average sub-school ESCS after controlling for school type and educational track as
social segregation occurs largely between tracks and between school types. In contrast to
what we would expect, we find a non-linear negative association between school educational
resources and performance and a positive association of performance with the number of
students per teacher. The direction of association between performance and school size is
not clear as we find the relation to be locally positive and locally negative (i.e., wiggly).
<Table 7 about here >
In Model Math III, we include random school effects to control for unobserved school-level
heterogeneity. By taking this unobserved random school level heterogeneity into account,
our model estimates it is optimal to employ no smoothing; we return to a fully parametric
model. Results still hold.18 However, as discussed in Section 4, inclusion of random effects
implies we assume that unobserved school-level heterogeneity is not correlated with the
included school-level and pupil-level characteristics. Although we control for many pupil-
level and school-level heterogeneity, this is still a hard assumption. Therefore, we confirm
in alternative estimates (available upon request) that all further results are robust for the
exclusion of random effects.19
As discussed, the PISA dataset groups pupils in ‘Public schools’ and ‘Publicly financed,
privately operating schools’ to control for school type. However, as there are 3 public
school types in Flanders (i.e., education organized by cities, provinces and the Flemish
Community), we use anonymous data to control for the school type heterogeneity within
public education. Model Math IV shows that the finding of a positive relation between
18Almost all schools come from different school governing bodies in our sample. There are only 2
governing bodies that have 2 schools in the sample. Therefore, we did not include random or fixed effects
at the level of the governing body. As expected, there is no variation in school autonomy in budgeting
issues within these 2 governing bodies.
19In particular, the quantile regression results in Appendix of model Math VI with no random effects,
discussed further, show that results are robust for altering the approach to deal with unobserved school-
level heterogeneity.
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educational performance and autonomy in budget allocation is not driven by school type
differences. In particular, we find that variation in budgeting autonomy explains 0.1 stan-
dard deviation of pupil performance in math.
Overall, we extensively controlled for the heterogeneity in student population and institu-
tions between schools. As we use cross-sectional pupil level data, estimates can be sensitive
for influences of reverse causality, simultaneity and unobserved selection. In the view of the
following arguments, we don’t think our results are substantially affected by these issues.
First, on the reverse causality problem, it is possible that the school direction in well-
performing schools receive more autonomy. In other words, autonomy can be the result of
performance, instead of the reverse. In our study in the Flemish context, we do not expect
this kind of reverse causality.
1) Pupil examination is not centralized, implying many school governing boards have no
information on pupil achievement that can be used in school principal evaluations. The
PISA 2006 dataset indicates that in only a few schools (9 out of the 126 sampled schools),
performance data (e.g. mean exam scores, average test results, rates of success in higher
education) are used to evaluate the school direction. Model Math V shows that the signifi-
cant positive relation between educational performance and school autonomy in budgeting
also holds for the subsample of schools in which there is no evaluation of the school’s di-
rection, based on achievement data.
2) School principals have many and complex tasks. Therefore, the criteria to evaluate
school principals are complex and case specific. In the words of a Flemish policy maker:
“No one knows about the quality of the principal” (Day et al., 2008). It is thus probable
that perceived principal performance is only weakly related with actual principal perfor-
mance.
3) As discussed in OECD (2008a), in the period studied, there is a lack of school self-
evaluation in Flemish secondary education. Only recently, programs for self-evaluation are
installed (OECD, 2011). Thus even if there would be knowledge on the school principal’s
performance, in many governing bodies, this information will not be used in evaluations,
as evaluations are more focused on being in line with regulatory requirements.
4) From our review of qualitative studies, referenced in the Introduction, we conclude that
the characteristics and composition of the school board are the main drivers of variation in
school autonomy. Most of the variation in school board characteristics and responsibility
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structures are the result of (i) historical reasons20, (ii) discontinuities caused by political
elections and political appointments21, (iii) differences in the interpretation of the law and
job description22 and (iv) other unobserved heterogeneity such as geographical development
and budgetary tensions that can, in the Flemish context, be considered as approximately
random.
Second, on the simultaneity problem, we do not a priori want to exclude the possibility that
dynamic principals and teachers struggle for both more autonomy and higher educational
achievement in the school, without there needs to be a causal relation between school
autonomy and educational achievement. Dynamic staff can in more autonomous schools
use their freedom to among others organize lectures, plan field trips or guide extracurricular
projects to raise academic standards. Differently put, autonomy gives the local staff the
possibility to exert their dynamism. Estimation issues arise when the variation in the school
staff empowerment in budgeting is related to unobserved variation in school dynamism.
To obtain insight whether this is the case, we first investigate whether our variation in
school autonomy in budgeting is correlated with variation in school dynamism. To proxy
school dynamism, we use PISA school-level questionnaire items on the promotion of science,
opportunities to learn about environmental topics and preparation for further education.
Schools that among others participate in competitions, organize lectures or guide projects
in these fields are expected to also organize these extracurricular activities in other fields
and are labeled as dynamic. Table 8 shows there is little correlation between our proxies for
school staff dynamism and school staff empowerment, indicating that our variation in staff
autonomy is not simply reflecting the school staff dynamism. Therefore staff autonomy
per se matters for educational performance
20Some governing boards in catholic education originate from e.g. dioceses that were very actively
involved in education and centrally structured, whereas others stem from orders, dioceses and congregations
that left school policy in the hands of educational personnel, i.e. the school principals. (Devos et al., 1999)
21School case studies in Devos et al. (1999) illustrate that changes in the political composition of local
authorities and provincial authorities (the governing bodies of respectively city schools and provincial
schools) resulted in new responsibility structures within school governing bodies.
22Some school governing bodies restrict themselves to daily management of schools, while others inter-
vene in all facets of school policy. Other school governing bodies only have a formal existence. In one
extreme case example, the governing board did not deliberate on school policy in the last three years.(Devos
et al., 1999)
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Further, if we include the proxies for school dynamism (separately or grouped) into our
analysis, results for school autonomy do not change.23 In particular, Model Math VI shows
both a significant effect of two proxies for school dynamism (i.e., extracurricular science
projects and lectures and/or seminars on environmental topics) and school autonomy in
budget allocation. No interactions were found. The effect found of school autonomy in
budgeting is only significant at the 10 percent level when we consider the first plausible
value of math as dependent variable. However, if we use the four other plausible values,
the effect is significant at the 5 percent level, indicating a robust significant positive effect
of autonomy in budget allocation on math performance (see Table 9).
Third, on the self-selection problem, as discussed and argued above, approximately random
school board characteristics drive the variation in school autonomy. We thus expect no
endogeneity of assignment of treatment of school principals. Further, as it is unobserved for
students and teachers that consider to enter a school whether or not the school governing
body or school’s direction is in charge of budgeting issues, we do not expect that school
choice by pupils and teachers is related to school staff empowerment in our specific setting.
As discussed, autonomy in budget formation is limited to additional funding above a
centrally imposed funding scheme. Table 10 shows a non-robust positive effect of school
autonomy in budget formation. Once we control for the four main school types in Flanders,
we do not find a (robust) significant effect of school staff empowerment in budget formation
on math performance.
<Table 8 about here >
Finally, we test the sensitivity of our findings for test scores in different subjects and dif-
ferent definitions of school autonomy. We ran Model VI for science and reading (see Table
10). For science, we find for both autonomy in budget allocation and budget formation
a robust positive effect. As the additional budgets are very small in comparison to the
school budget, we expect that the effect of budget formation is not mainly driven by an
informational advantage of the agents. It is more plausible that higher perceived budget
formation autonomy motivates the school staff (see Frey (1993)), with better education
quality as result. For reading, we find the relation to be insignificant for both budget
23Results available on request.
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allocation and budget formation. A possible explanation is that autonomy in budgeting
is not used to promote reading literacy. Another interpretation is that for reading, the
unobserved heterogeneity is larger. For reading, only 52 percent of variation can be ex-
plained by Model Read VI, whereas Math VI and Science VI explain respectively 57 and
58 percent.
As discussed above, we defined school autonomy in budget allocation (formation) as a
binary indicator, equal to one if the school principal ticks that school direction or teach-
ers have a considerable responsibility in the task of budget allocation (formation), zero
otherwise. If we exclude joint-decision making (with the school governing board or higher
levels) from the definition of school autonomy, results still hold.24
We have tested the robustness of the findings for different model specification. We have
regressed a fully parametric model with random school effects, included variation in prob-
ability weights and clustering within strata. In addition, we have tested the effect on the
results of including the ‘dropped’ variables. The findings remain robust to all such speci-
fication changes. Results are available upon request.
To test for a possible unequal effect of autonomy on educational performance, we compared
the effects at the bottom and the top of test scores distribution by a quantile regression
approach. Results in Appendix show no indications that school staff autonomy affects top
and low performers differently.
<Table 9 about here >
<Table 10 about here >
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have tested whether a combination of accountability and autonomy in ed-
ucation provision can improve educational performance as measured by PISA test scores.
24Results available upon request. We find no indications that joint-decision making is less or more
effective than strict autonomy. The coefficient of school autonomy is not significantly different, but results
are statistically more significant. This is probably due to the fact that there is more variation in autonomy
when using the strict definition.
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There is ample cross-country and cross-school type (e.g. charter school literature) evi-
dence for this. But these studies cannot separate the effects of school autonomy from
(time-varying) country-specific or school type specific effects.
We test this conjecture on the PISA-dataset for Flanders, where there is substantial vari-
ation within school-type in autonomy and other institutional settings. In Flanders, the
government delegates a lot of budgeting responsibilities to non-profit school governing
bodies that can group multiple schools. There is variation in the extent this budgeting
authority is further delegated to the school staff (the school’s direction and teachers). The
reviewed qualitative research shows that this variation in school autonomy mainly origi-
nates from approximately random school governing board characteristics. Higher school
staff empowerment should lead to better use of local information and better performance,
if the central government can align incentives properly. In Flanders, there are no central
examinations, but inspection teams investigate on a regular basis whether the curriculum
and teaching process are aimed at reaching the centrally imposed final standards, and
whether budget formation is in keeping with the posed requirements. In addition, freedom
in budget formation is limited to additional funding, above the centrally imposed funding
system. This ensures that information asymmetries are not misused by local staff and so
that autonomy should improve performance. Therefore Flanders is a very good testing
ground for the theory that the institution of school autonomy, through improved incen-
tives for schools and teachers, will affect resource-allocation decisions and ultimately the
educational performance of students positively.
Our findings support this hypothesis. While including a large set of student-level and
school-level controls, we find indeed that local staff empowerment clearly and significantly
boosts educational outcomes. Results are robust for controlling for reverse causality or
variation in school dynamism. Overall, we confirm cross-country evidence and within-
country between school type evidence for a positive effect of school (staff) autonomy on
educational performance by separating the effect of school staff autonomy from school type
specific effects.
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Appendix
A Flemish educational landscape
<Figure 1 about here >
<Table 1 about here >
B Plausible values
PISA 2006 uses a plausible values approach to come to student population estimates of
knowledge and skills in math, science and reading literacy. A plausible value approach was
developed for and used in the 1983-84 US National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP). Thereafter, it is used in among others the TIMSS and PISA survey. A detailed
discussion of the plausible value technique is given in Wu (2005) and OECD (2005, chapter
6). We briefly discuss the interpretation of plausible values.
The main problem in cognitive testing is that the latent pupil skills and knowledge is
unobserved. Testing for skills by e.g. a PISA questionnaire involves thus measurement
error above the sampling error. In social sciences, the measurement error is expected to
be substantial, first, as result of the broadness of the concept that is measured and, sec-
ond, because tested pupils may be affected by day-to-day (mental and physical) variation
and conditions under which the test occurs (OECD, 2005). In result, the measurement
error depends on the precision of the test and on pupil-level characteristics. Population
statistics will be biased if the measurement error is not taken into account. To construct
unbiased population estimates, first, the distribution of student ability is estimated, using
the (discontinuous) test items and background variables. Second, random draws are taken
from this so called ‘posterior ’ distribution of student skills. Plausible values are thus mul-
tiple random draws from the unobservable latent student achievement. The standard error
between the plausible values gives an indication of the magnitude of pupil-level measure-
ment error. As discussed in OECD (2005), a priori averaging plausible values to conduct
pupil-level inference leads to biased estimates. One should use the plausible values to do
the regressions. Afterwards, one can take the average of the coefficients if wanted.
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C The P-splines approach of Eilers and Marx (1996)
A large methodological literature has focused on the issue how to represent smooth func-
tions and to choose the smoothness of these functions (Wood, 2006). The popular backfit-
ting approach of Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) has the benefit that multiple smooth terms
can be included, with the cost that the model selection (= selection of number of smooths)
can be quite cumbersome (Wood and Augustin, 2002). The alternative approach of Gu
and Wahba (1991) has solved the model selection problem but at a high computational
cost limiting its use. The regression spline approach is a computationally efficient approach
to estimate a semiparametric additive model with integrated model selection (see among
others Eilers and Marx (1996), Marx and Eilers (1998), Wahba (1980) and Wahba (1990)
). We use this approach as implemented in the mgcv package in R with automatic and
integrated smoothing parameter selection (see Wood (2006)). The spline approaches are
not suited to include categorical variables, and so we include those variables parametrically.
We thus have a semiparametric partially linear mixed model.
The smooth function of a spline approach is a weighted sum of a basis of r overlapping
splines. We use a cubic spline with local support (B-spline)25. By altering the weight of
the splines by weight parameter αj, with j = 1, . . . , r on usually evenly spaced knots in
function of minimization of the squared error, we obtain a flexible nonparametric smooth.
Formally, the smooth function sˆ(x)(α)i can be represented as the sum of r overlapping basis
functions, multiplied by the respective basis parameters αj, with j = 1, . . . , r.
sˆ(x)(α)i =
r￿
j=1
αjBj(x), such that ∀x,
r￿
j=1
Bj(x) = 1. (2)
To estimate a regression via P-splines, α is estimated by minimizing the squared error
(known as the L2 norm) with inclusion of a penalty on wiggliness for each smooth function
to avoid oversmoothing. Usually, the second order differences are penalized (d=2), however
other penalty structures are also possible. As in Bollaerts et al. (2006), we define the L2
norm as follows:
L2 =
m￿
i=1
(yi − sˆ(x)(α)i)2 + λ
r￿
j=d+1
(￿dαj)2, (3)
25A univariate B-spline of degree q smoothly joins q+1 polynomial pieces of degree q at q interior knots
in the local support. The local support implies that outside the boundaries, the value is zero.
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with ￿dαj being the dth order differences, that is ￿dαj = ￿1(￿d−1αj) with ￿1αj =
αj − αj−1 and with λ a non-negative smoothness parameter. It can easily be shown that
the L2 can be extended to include simultaneously a parametric part, random effects and
univariate smooths in an additive approach.
D Effects at the Top and Bottom
To test for a possible unequal effect of autonomy on educational performance, we compare
the effects at the bottom and the top of test scores distribution. For this, we estimate
a quantile regression as initiated in the seminal work of Koenker and Bassett (1978).
This approach allows a more complete picture of the conditional distribution of pupil
performance. In this approach the conditional αth quantile (α ∈ (0, 1)) is defined as the
test threshold such that α percent of the pupils of the reference group perform worse. For
example, in the socio-economic status x, a quarter of the pupils performs worse than the
score threshold q0.25(x). It is common practice to use a so called ‘check function approach’
to estimate a quantile regression via minimization of weighted absolute deviations from
the fit.
L1 =
n￿
i=1
ρθ(yi − xiβˆ), (4)
with x a vector of regressors, β a vector of coefficients and with check function ρθ being
defined as
ρθ(τ) =
￿
θτ if τ ≥ 0 (resp. τ ≤ 0)
(θ − 1)τ otherwise,
with τ being defined as yi − xiβˆ. Weight factor θ indicates how positive and negative
values of τ are weighted. If θ = 0.5, positive and negative values are equally weighted and
the median is estimated. If θ = 0.75, positive values of τ receive a weight that is three
times higher than the weight of negative values; the third quartile is estimated.
However, a drawback of a quantile regression approach is the lack of a consensus on how
to include random school effects in the model. As such, the advantage of a more complete
picture of the conditional distribution of pupil performance comes at the cost that we
cannot control for random school effects.
We opt for the parametric quantile regression approach, as implemented in the package
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‘quantreg’ in R of Koenker (2011). We estimate 20 quantile regressions of model Math VI
(without random school effects) with θ between 0.05 and 0.95.
The results in Figure 2 and 3 show the relation between the conditional quantile (x-axis)
and the estimated coefficient (y-axis) for model Math VI with autonomy in budget allo-
cation included. The shaded area denotes the 90% confidence interval. The results show
that the effects of family background, social segregation and shortage of adequate teaching
personnel are larger for pupils in the lower end of the distribution of math performance.
Further, the quantile regressions show robustness of our findings. School staff empower-
ment has a significant positive effect on pupil performance. Lastly, we find no significant
differences in the effect of school autonomy in budgeting over the conditional distribution of
pupil performance. In line with the semiparametric analysis, results for budget formation
are less pronounced (see Figure 4).
<Figure 2 about here >
<Figure 3 about here >
<Figure 4 about here >
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Table 1: Number of schools per school governing body
Mean St.Dev. Min. 25 perc. Median 75 perc. Max.
Organized by Flemish Community 8.50 2.99 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.25 14.00
Organized by city 2.50 4.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 22.00
Organized by province 6.40 4.77 1.00 2.00 7.00 11.00 11.00
Subsidized private school 2.66 2.64 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 21.00
Note: Data from the academic year 2012-2013. 337 school governing bodies and 1047 schools.
Source: Flemish Department of Education and Training.
Table 2: Pupil performance
Variable Mean St.Dev.
PISA 2006 Performance in math 560.3 (87.3)
PISA 2006 Performance in reading 543.0 (89.7)
PISA 2006 Performance in science 545.5 (82.0)
Difference PISA 2006 and PISA 2000 on reading -10 (7.7)
Difference PISA 2006 and PISA 2003 on math -10 (4.5)
Note: A SAS procedure for a Balanced Repeated Replication procedure with 80 replication estimates and
5 plausible values for each subject, described in OECD (2005), is used to construct the mean and standard
error.
Source: OECD (2006) for last two rows.
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Table 3: School-level variation in perceived school autonomy, total of 126 schools
Who has a considerable responsibility School’s direction Non-profit Regional or local National
for the following tasks? or teachers school governing body education education
(multiple ticks are allowed) authorities authorities
Selecting teachers for hire 120 51 4 3
Firing teachers 101 87 1 2
Establishing teachers’ starting salaries 1 1 20 104
Determining teachers’ salaries increases 1 1 19 106
Formulating the school budget 110 88 7 9
Deciding on budget allocations within the school 107 72 4 10
Establishing student disciplinary policies 125 33 6 9
Establishing student assessment policies 121 31 10 10
Approving students for admission to the school 117 16 11 24
Choosing which textbooks are used 125 6 1 2
Determining course content 88 7 28 64
Deciding which courses are offered 108 37 31 58
Table 4: Summary statistics on school autonomy
Variables Students Schools Private Public
(proportions)
Autonomy in budget allocation 0.85 107 80 27
- for school direction, not school board 0.40 49 35 14
- for school direction, not any other higher level 0.38 47 34 13
Autonomy in budget formation 0.88 110 81 29
- for school direction, not school board 0.28 36 26 10
- for school direction, not any other higher level 0.27 35 25 10
Number of observations 3603 126 92 34
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Table 5: Summary statistics, categorical variables
Variable Students Schools Private Public
(proportions)
Autonomy in budget allocation 0.85 107 80 27
Autonomy in budget formation 0.88 110 81 29
Teacher shortage (other disciplines) 0.20 27 18 9
Selection by schools on academic record or recommendation 0.67 81 56 25
Achievement data used to evaluate principal 0.07 9 6 3
Organized by city 0.03 5
Organized by province 0.04 5
Organized by Flemish Community 0.17 24
Subsidized private school 0.76 92
Village (< 3,000) 0.01 1 1 0
Small town (3,000 up to 15000) 0.29 35 29 6
Town (15,000 up to 100,000) 0.60 77 55 22
City (100,000 up to 1,000,000) 0.10 13 7 6
General education 0.50
Technical-arts education 0.33
Vocational education 0.17
Female 0.48
First-generation immigrant 0.03
Second-generation immigrant 0.02
Immigrant that speaks no off. Belgian language at home 0.02
Not lagging behind 0.79
Hours math per week: 0 0.04
Hours math per week: less than 2 0.19
Hours math per week: 2 up to 4 0.35
Hours math per week: 4 up to 6 0.40
Hours math per week: more than 6 0.03
Hours Dutch per week: 0 0.04
Hours Dutch per week: less than 2 0.22
Hours Dutch per week: 2 up to 4 0.41
Hours Dutch per week: 4 up to 6 0.31
Hours Dutch per week: more than 6 0.01
Hours science per week: 0 0.15
Hours science per week: less than 2 0.31
Hours science per week: 2 up to 4 0.32
Hours science per week: 4 up to 6 0.13
Hours science per week: more than 6 0.09
Number of observations 3603 126 92 34
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Table 6: Summary statistics, continuous variables
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min. 25 perc. Med. 75 perc. Max
ESCS 0.29 0.85 -2.83 -0.32 0.27 0.94 2.99
Sub-school average ESCS 0.29 0.44 -1.30 0.02 0.32 0.63 1.64
School educational resources 0.10 0.84 -1.93 -0.38 0.09 0.46 2.14
Student-teacher ratio 9.27 2.38 4.11 7.56 9.20 11.30 14.04
School size 693.65 294.96 84 470 674 877 1712
Note: A SAS procedure for a Balanced Repeated Replication procedure with 80 replication estimates,
described in OECD (2005), is used to construct the mean and standard error of the mean. The school
educational resources index is a composite of the the quality of educational resources. It is composed
from the principal’s perception of shortage or inadequacy on 7 items of educational resources that can
hinder instruction at school: 1) science laboratory equipment, 2) instructional materials (e.g. textbooks),
3) computers for instruction, 4) internet connectivity, 5) computer software for instruction, 6) library
materials, 7) audio-visual resources.
38
Table 7: Effect of school autonomy in budget allocation, full model
Model Math I Math II Math III Math IV Math V Math VI
Plausible Value PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1
(Intercept) 362.26*** 362.62*** 332.30*** 327.36*** 320.14*** 310.20***
(11.71) (13.45) (24.69) (23.91) (23.98) (23.29)
Autonomy in budget allocation 13.43*** 6.73* 10.68* 9.78◦ 10.84◦ 10.45◦
(2.80) (2.92) (5.36) (5.25) (5.59) (5.38)
Privately operating school 18.48*** 12.44*** 14.78**
(2.40) (2.69) (4.72)
General education track 117.06*** 107.68*** 103.07*** 103.90*** 100.99*** 99.34***
(3.57) (4.72) (5.54) (5.50) (5.74) (5.72)
Technical-arts education track 65.90*** 66.22*** 65.74*** 65.57*** 63.93*** 63.48***
(3.28) (3.49) (3.64) (3.62) (3.79) (3.78)
Gender (female=1) -20.81*** -20.34*** -18.47*** -18.19*** -19.06*** -19.19***
(1.97) (1.97) (2.07) (2.07) (2.15) (2.15)
Small town 54.89*** 74.50*** 69.95*** 68.55*** 72.16*** 80.29***
(10.12) (11.75) (20.73) (19.80) (19.62) (18.97)
Town 47.30*** 67.37*** 61.75** 63.29** 66.03*** 73.34***
(10.05) (11.91) (20.66) (19.74) (19.57) (18.93)
City 43.63*** 61.43*** 56.00** 54.48** 57.71** 64.32**
(10.50) (12.36) (21.32) (20.36) (20.16) (19.62)
Lessons test subject, less than 2 hours 2.85 1.13 -2.12 -2.50 -1.22 -1.49
(5.45) (5.42) (5.36) (5.36) (55.11) (5.51)
Lessons test subject, 2 up to 4 hours 3.95 1.56 -2.98 -3.34 -3.05 -3.33
(5.51) (5.48) (5.41) (5.41) (55.62) (5.56)
Lessons test subject, 4 up to 6 hours 27.00*** 24.82*** 20.20*** 19.83*** 21.23*** 21.11***
(5.68) (5.64) (5.55) (5.55) (56.98) (5.70)
Lessons test subject, 6 or more hours 33.66*** 31.71*** 24.78** 24.33** 23.93** 24.56**
(8.02) (7.94) (7.80) (7.80) (7.97) (8.00)
First-generation immigrant -21.42** -17.51* -10.76 -10.86 -12.06◦ -11.56
(7.02) (7.00) (6.96) (6.95) (7.09) (7.09)
Second-generation immigrant -19.36** -21.51** -15.50* -15.24* -25.87** -26.46**
(7.25) (7.47) (7.34) (7.33) (8.26) (8.25)
Immigrant, no off. Belgian language at home -15.84◦ -16.36◦ -18.46* -18.77* -14.44 -13.96
(8.86) (8.89) (8.70) (8.70) (9.02) (9.02)
Not lagging behind 50.14*** 49.34*** 47.51*** 47.41*** 47.99*** 47.62***
(2.61) (2.59) (2.54) (2.54) (2.62) (2.63)
ESCS 6.05*** Pos.*** 5.40*** 5.40*** 5.55*** 5.51***
(1.27) (1.27) (1.27) (1.32) (1.32)
Teacher shortage -12.09*** -9.37◦ -9.65* -12.51* -11.92*
(2.68) (4.81) (4.69) (4.95) (4.78)
Selectivity of school 1.64 4.73 6.21 7.04◦ 5.72
(2.19) (4.01) (3.936) (4.07) (3.94)
Average ESCS (sub-)school 2.33 2.14 2.21 3.21 4.47
(3.83) (5.06) (4.97) (5.05) (5.00)
School educational resources Neg.*** -2.73 Neg. -4.57* -3.70◦
(2.21) (2.27) (2.20)
Student-teacher ratio Pos.*** 3.28*** 3.07*** 3.44*** 3.09***
(0.96) (0.92) (0.94) (0.91)
School size Wiggly*** 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Extracurricular science projects (including research) 9.08*
(3.79)
Lectures and/or seminars on environmental topics 8.86*
(4.24)
Student-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random school effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed school type FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Control for reverse causality No No No No Yes Yes
Control for school dynamism No No No No No Yes
R2 (adj.) 0.554 0.566 0.56 0.565 0.567 0.569
Obs. 3603 3603 3603 3603 3346 3318
Significance levels : ◦ : 10% : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
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Table 8: Correlation between proxies for school dynamism and school autonomy in budgeting
Autonomy in Autonomy in
budget allocation budget formation
Aut. in budget allocation 1.00 0.36
Aut. in budget formation 0.36 1.00
Science clubs -0.05 0.08
Science fairs 0.10 0.08
Science competitions 0.10 0.11
Extracurricular science projects (including research) 0.04 0.00
Excursions and field trips related to science -0.03 -0.13
Outdoor education related to environmental topics 0.04 -0.12
Trips to museums (related to env. topics) -0.11 -0.09
Trips to science and/or technology centres -0.05 0.06
Extracurricular environmental projects (including research) 0.15 0.10
Lectures and/or seminars on environmental topics (e.g. guest speakers) 0.02 0.06
Job fairs 0.07 -0.05
Lectures (at school) by business or industry representatives -0.08 0.04
Visits to local businesses or industries 0.01 -0.07
40
Table 9: Effect of school autonomy in budgeting, different plausible values
Model Math VI Math VI Math VI Math VI
Plausible Value PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5
Autonomy in budget allocation 13.99* 11.72* 11.04* 11.04*
(5.54) (5.54) (5.54) (5.56)
R2 (adj.) 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58
Autonomy in budget formation 11.63* 8.59 9.34 8.07
(5.80) (5.79) (5.77) (5.81)
R2 (adj.) 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58
Model Science VI Science VI Science VI Science VI
Plausible Value PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5
Autonomy in budget allocation 12.82** 10.72* 12.20* 11.00*
(4.87) (4.82) (4.94) (4.88)
R2 (adj.) 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.59
Autonomy in budget formation 17.01*** 13.90** 15.79** 15.60**
(4.93) (4.92) (5.02) (4.94)
R2 (adj.) 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59
Model Read VI Read VI Read VI Read VI
Plausible Value PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5
Autonomy in budget allocation 8.74 8.67 10.77 9.79
(6.81) (6.49) (6.87) (6.92)
R2 (adj.) 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.52
Autonomy in budget formation 10.69 6.73 9.80 10.98
(7.05) (6.77) (7.17) (7.18)
R2 (adj.) 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.53
Student-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random school effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed school type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for reverse causality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for school dynamism Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3318 3318 3318 3318
Significance levels : ◦ : 10% : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
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Table 10: Effect of school autonomy in budgeting
Model Math I Math II Math III Math IV Math V Math VI Science VI Read VI
Plausible Value PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1 PV1
Autonomy in budget allocation 13.43*** 6.73* 10.68* 9.78◦ 10.84◦ 10.45◦ 10.91* 11.12
(2.80) (2.92) (5.36) (5.25) (5.59) (5.38) (4.78) (6.97)
R2 (adj.) 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.52
Autonomy in budget formation 8.09** 7.26* 10.21◦ 7.32 7.63 7.02 14.62** 10.77
(3.00) (3.11) (5.73) (5.60) (5.82) (5.61) (4.86) (7.28)
R2 (adj.) 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.52
Student-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random school effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed school type FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for reverse causality No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for school dynamism No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3603 3603 3603 3603 3346 3318 3318 3318
Significance levels : ◦ : 10% : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
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Figure 2: Quantile regression results - Part I
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
45
0
Intercept
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
5
10
15
20
25
Aut. in budget allocation
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
80
90
10
0
11
0
General education
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
Technical−arts education
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−2
5
−2
0
−1
5
Gender (female=1)
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
Small town
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
Town
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
City
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
● ●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−2
0
−1
0
0
10
20
30
Lessons math (less than 2 hours)
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−2
0
−1
0
0
10
20
Lessons math (2 up to 4 hours)
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
Lessons math (4 up to 6 hours)
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
20
40
60
80
Lessons math (more than 6 hours)
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
43
Figure 3: Quantile regression results - Part II
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−5
0
−4
0
−3
0
−2
0
−1
0
0
10
First−generation imm.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−6
0
−4
0
−2
0
0
Second−generation imm.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−4
0
−2
0
0
20
40
Immigrant, other language
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
40
45
50
55
60
Not lagging behind
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−3
0
−2
0
−1
0
0
Teacher shortage
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−5
0
5
10
Selectivity of school
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Average ESCS (sub−)school
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
ESCS
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−1
0
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
School educational resources
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
1
2
3
4
5
6
Student−teacher ratio
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−0
.0
15
−0
.0
05
0.
00
5
0.
01
5
School size
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
5
10
15
20
Extracurricular science projects
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
5
10
15
Lectures and/or seminars
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
44
Figure 4: Quantile regression results of school autonomy in budget formation
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